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Creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms since the act of conferring a 
loan has the indirect effect of signaling the trustworthiness of the borrower. We test the 
creditworthiness-trustworthiness nexus in an investment game experiment on a sample 
of participants/non participants to a microfinance program in Argentina and find that 
trustors give significantly more to (and believe they will receive more from) microfinance 
borrowers. Trustees’ first and second order beliefs are also consistent with this picture. 
Our findings identify a “horizontal trustworthiness externality” which creates a direct 
(loan-performance) causality nexus since the mere loan provision increases the 
borrower’s attractiveness as a business partner.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms
1. With the lending decision a financial 
intermediary is not just transferring money but also making an act of confidence on the borrower’s 
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1 Guinnane (2005) reminds us that the Latin root of “credit,” credere, means, among other things, to trust, while in the 
German word gläubiger the two meanings of credit and trust coincide.  
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ability of using the money properly and paying back the principal and the interest to the bank after the 
success of her
2 investment project.  
The act of conferring confidence has not just a private but also a social effect. The lending relationship 
may be conceived as a bond in which the trust of the lender contributes to a trustworthiness reaction of 
the borrower, that is, a bond which generates mutual trust. It is also understandable that a positive 
experience of the borrower with the microfinance institution (MFI) may generate trust of friends and 
relatives in the microfinance organization (a “vertical” individual/organisation externality).
3 What is 
generally not explored is however the horizontal trust externality that the loan concession may generate. 
The loan indeed reveals to all those who come to know about it that the borrower has been considered 
trustworthy by a financial institution which is conventionally regarded as having a specific expertise on 
screening qualities of projects and their proposers. In the case of microfinance with group lending and 
joint liability the signal may even be stronger since the borrower also passes the selection of peers 
(groupmates), which are expected to be more informed than the bank about her type and project 
quality.  
Hence, by providing a loan, the financial institution is also creating social capital under the form of 
trustworthiness
4.  
In an economic environment in which individuals operate within a framework of imperfect and 
incomplete information and cannot foresee (and regulate with contract clauses) all possible future 
contingencies arising from a business relationship
5, the creation of trustworthiness has relevant 
economic effects. It indeed eases the possibility that economic agents accept the borrower as a business 
counterpart even though they do not have full information about her and the events which will affect 
the relationship in the future.  
                                                 
2 In our experiment we have both male and female borrowers but we will use the female pronoun and adjective only for 
simplicity.  
3 “You trust them and they too make a trust jump that is key to the institution” (Rodrigo Zarazaga, co-founder of Protagonizar, the 
microfinance institution involved in the experiment presented and discussed in this paper) 
4 Social capital is a multifaceted concept which includes at least five dimensions: trust, trustworthiness, willingness to pay for 
public goods, civic sense and trust on institutions (Degli Antoni, 2009). We refer only to the first two meanings here. 
5 The issue has been thoroughly debated in the incomplete contract literature originating from the pioneering contributions 
by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). The incomplete contract paradigm has been fruitfully applied to 
issues such as political economy, fiscal federalism, industrial organization, public procurement, regulation, privatization, 
transition economies, international trade or law and economics.  
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This is all the more so since many aspects of business relationships have an investment game structure
6 
(Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). The relationships between business partners, between an 
entrepreneur and her suppliers have generally a sequential structure such that one of the two parties has 
to take the initiative first by sharing something (knowledge, physical or financial assets). After her move 
the counterpart can be induced to do the same or to abuse of the trust of the first mover. As in the  
investment game the counterparts’ joint decision to share (the trustor) and not to abuse (the trustee) 
generates superadditivity and therefore a higher outcome than the two suboptimal equilibria in which 
the first player shares and is abused or the first player decides not to share because she is afraid of the 
risk of being abused. In such framework situations in which the second part is more trustworthy induce 
the trustor to give more thereby increasing the total payoff of the game. 
Hence, in some way, the mere act of giving credit, by creating trustworthiness, generates an indirect 
positive effect on the capacity of the borrower to repay the loan. This mechanism is all the more 
important in the context in which microfinance operates.  
Microfinance loans are often uncollateralized and therefore lender’s expectations on borrower’s 
trustworthiness are of paramount importance. Even though the microfinance literature has widely 
shown that, in absence of collateral, other incentives such as peer pressure under group lending 
(Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994), progressive loan mechanisms under individual lending and 
social sanctions (Wydick, 1999; Karlan, 2005a) are at work, the question remains relevant since all these 
incentives have drawbacks
7 and their effectiveness largely depends from the social environment in 
which a microfinance institution  operates. 
To our knowledge, the nexus between creditworthiness and trustworthiness has never been tested 
directly in microfinance. We do it in this paper with an experiment on borrowers of a microfinance 
institution operating in the suburbs of Buenos Aires and on a control group of eligible non borrowers 
                                                 
6 For details on investment games see section 4.2 
7 Group lending with joint liability may generate free riding on peer monitoring (Besley and Coate 1995) when groups 
become large and borrowers’ run  (Bond and Rai, 2006) when they come to know before the borrower about groupmate 
inability to repay the loan. Furthermore, the joint liability creates an extra burden on the borrower who generally prefers 
individual lending. This explains the tendency of many MFIs (including the Grameen) to move from group lending to 




who live in the same area and do not have any other banking relationship. The treatment and control 
groups play an investment game where the unique information a player has about her counterpart is 
whether she is or not a microfinance borrower (in their same institution). The investment game 
provides, on our opinion, a faithful reproduction of the dilemma of business partnerships where trust 
and trustworthiness are fundamental for the innumerable decisions in which one of the two parts 
anticipates something to the other (money, know how, etc.) in a framework of imperfect information 
and incomplete contracts. 
The hypothesis that MF loan concession may be a signal of this wider kind of trustworthiness needs 
therefore empirical testing. Note that our result is not trivial also because, given the characteristics of 
the game, the investment game’s trustworthiness is not the same as that required in the actual 
microfinance relationship (in the former there is no social or pecuniary sanction for lack of payback 
from the receiver). 
The neatest result of our field experiment is that both treatment and control (MF and non-MF 
borrower) trustors give significantly more to MF than to non-MF trustees and believe that the former 
will repay significantly more than the latter. We interpret trustors’ behavior in the sense explained in 
this introduction (they do so because the creditworthiness revealed by being clients of the MF 
institution is a signal of trustworthiness). 
Behaviors and beliefs of trustors are validated by the actual behavior of trustees who pay back 
significantly more when being MF borrowers. Trustees’ first and second order beliefs are also 
consistent with the picture,  that is, they expect more from trustors who know they are playing with a 
MF trustee (I order beliefs) and believe that trustors believe that they will give more if they are MF 
trustees (II order beliefs). 
Our results aim to contribute in an original way to important issues debated in the literature.  
In a historical reconstruction of factors of success or failure of credit programs for the poor, Guinname 
(2005) argues that it is the quality of incentives and sanctions (and not a difference in the level of trust), 
which makes a program successful. Without underestimating the fundamental role of incentives, our  
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results however show that microfinance borrowers are trustworthy not just because of incentives. MF 
trustees give more even in the anonymous investment game experiment where no individual penalty or 
social blame is posed on lack of trustworthiness.
8     
Karlan (2005b) evaluates the predictive power of revealed trust and trustworthiness in investment 
games by looking at their impact on future borrowers’ performance. He shows that borrowers’ 
trustworthiness (but not trust) is a good predictor of their financial performance. On this basis he 
concludes that investment games are valid in eliciting trustworthiness and that the latter are important 
for the success of group lending programs. His concluding remark that his data “do not show whether 
trustworthiness can be created”  opens the way for the investigation we are doing here.  
Our findings provide an answer to Karlan (2005b)  by illustrating a channel through which 
trustworthiness can be created, that is, by showing that creditworthiness in MF programs is a signal of 
trustworthiness which triggers trust from other individuals living in the neighborhood, independently 
of their MF borrower/non-borrower status. 
Our results do not suffer from the almost unsolvable problem of endogeneity and reverse causality in 
microfinance impact studies where it is difficult to establish whether microfinance borrowers are better-
off (where they are demonstrated to be) because of the microfinance “treatment” or due to their prior 
higher abilities with respect to the control group of non-borrowers
9.  
Unlike studies aimed at evaluating the impact of microfinance on borrowers’ outcome variables, in our 
field experiment we test whether the act of giving credit is a signal which triggers trustworthiness. If 
such a result is found, the mechanism works no matter whether trustworthiness preexists before or is 
created after the loan concession. In this light, also the usual heterogeneity argument about how 
different responses of individuals to the treatment (i.e., borrower status) may affect estimations of the 
average treatment effect is not an issue in our experiment; in facts, we are not interested in the direct 
                                                 
8 Of course, Protagonizar incentives may have helped in selecting trustees which can be more trustworthy even in 
absence of monetary or social sanctions. 
9 Among the first microfinance papers dealing with these issues see Hulme and Mosley (1996), Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
and Coleman (1999).  
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responses of individuals to microfinance in terms of trust/trustworthiness level, but – as it will be clear in 
the next sections –  on how microfinance indirectly signals for trustworthiness.  
We further argue that framing effects (if any) do not weaken the relevance of our findings. If trustors’ 
choices were determined only by our emphasis on the only revealed element of the counterpart identity 
(the MF/non-MF borrower status) in the instructions given before playing the game, trustee responses 
and beliefs should also be affected by this information while we document that they are not. In facts, 
our evidence suggests that MF trustees send back more independently of the trustor’s MF/non-MF 
status. However, and more importantly, our core finding is the signaling effect arising from the MF 
borrower’s status and therefore, even if our result would be determined by a mere framing effect, it 
would nonetheless be relevant and have the important policy consequence that economic agents, in the 
particular economic environment analysed, should signal their MF borrower status in order to make 
their business relationship more successful.   
We conclude by arguing that our findings, under the maintained assumption that business relationships 
have the form of investment games, by identifying a clear-cut causality effect between the loan 
concession and trustworthiness, find a causality nexus between loan concession and economic 
performance which is so difficult to identify in microfinance studies with non randomized experiments 
due to the traditional selection bias problem.  
The paper is divided into eight sections (including introduction and conclusions). In the second section 
we sketch our theoretical framework. In the third section we describe the main features of the MF 
organization in which we perform our experiment. In the fourth section we illustrate the characteristics 
of the game and our specific design. In the fifth section we present descriptive evidence on trustor’s 
and trustee’s behavior. In the sixth section we present and comment econometric findings. The seventh 
section sheds more light on the causality nexus between trustworthiness and players’ MF/non-MF 
borrower status.  The eighth section concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical framework   
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Our theoretical hypothesis is made of two parts. The first part asserts that, in a framework of 
asymmetric information, loan concession is a signal of creditworthiness which implies trustworthiness. 
The second part claims that, if most of business relationships have the form of investment games, 
trustworthiness may significantly increase business success of the borrower. Hence, the microfinance 
loan concession generates by itself an effect which may increase the probability of borrower’s 
successful repayment   
 
2.1 The Model 
The population is composed of A and B-types. The two types differ for their degree of 
trustworthiness, measured in terms of the payback share (p  ∈[0,1]) when they are trustees in an 
investment game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) (whose characteristics are explained in section 4). 
More specifically, pA>pB, that is, A-type individuals are more trustworthy. The trustor does not know 
the trustee type but may receive a signal on her trustworthiness. We define q the trustor’s guess that the 
trustee is of A-type(q∈[0,1]) and s a signal (s∈[0,1]) affecting that guess. Trustor’s belief (TrB) on 
trustee’s contribution and contribution (TrC) are a function of q, that is, TrB'(q)>0 and  TrC'(q)>0. We 
assume that s is higher when the trustee has received a MF loan than when he has not. The loan 
concession event is a signal because when an individual becomes a borrower this implies that he has 
been regarded as trustworthy in the MF screening procedure and, in case of group lending, also by her 
group-mates. Hence q(s) is such that q(sMF)>q(sN-MF). 
The model is common knowledge so that trustees first order (FOB) and second order (SOB) beliefs are 
also consistent with this framework. More specifically, trustees believe that  
i)  trustors would give significantly more when they know that their counterpart is a MF borrower 
[FOB(q(s))] with FOB'(q(.))>0 ; 





2.2 Hypothesis testing 
The above mentioned theoretical framework induces us to formulate the following hypotheses: 
a) Trustor  contribution  H01: TrC(q(sMF)) = TrC(q(sN-MF)) vs. HA1:  TrC(q(sMF)) > TrC(q(sN-MF)) 
b)  Trustor  belief  H02: TrB(q(sMF)) = TrB(q(sN-MF)) vs. HA2:  TrB(q(sMF)) > TrB(q(sN-MF)) 
c) Trustee  contribution  H03:  TeCMF = TeCNON-MF  vs. HA3:  TeCMF> TeCNON-MF
10 
d)  Trustee first order belief  H04: FOB(q(sMF)) = FOB(q(0))  vs. HA4:  FOB(q(sMF)) > FOB(q(sN-MF))
f)  Trustee second order belief H05: SOB(q(sMF)) = SOB(q(0))  vs. HA5:  SOB(q(sMF)) > SOB(q(sN-MF))
If these null hypotheses are rejected in favor of the alternatives, and if business relationships of the 
borrowers can be conveniently represented by investment games, this implies that the MFI loan 
provision allows the borrower to receive more trust from business partners and generate higher 




3.  The main features of the MF institution under scrutiny  
“[...] The help we received from Protagonizar was enormous. I felt that not everything was lost. On some 
occasions we tried to get a bank loan but they asked for a credit card and wages receipt; impossible. Here 
instead, we go with our word, they believe and trust us. This is beautiful and I feel we are not alone [...]”. 12 
Protagonizar is a small and young organization which gave more than 3,000 uncollateralised   
loans in its six years of life. Located in the area of San Miguel (in second belt of Gran Buenos Aires, 
                                                 
10 If this null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative the microfinance signal in terms of trustworthiness is truthful. 
11 We also analyse whether there are significant differences in MFI players’ strategies according to the seniority of the 
borrower-bank credit relationship. Specifically, restricting the sample to MFI players only, the additional hypotheses we 
check are the following: 
g) Trustor  contribution  H01
(MFI):  TrC(•)VETERAN = TrC(•)NEW  vs. HA1
(MFI): TrC(•)VETERAN > TrC(•)NEW 
h)  Trustor  belief  H02
(MFI): TrB(•)VETERAN = TrB(•)NEW  vs. HA2
(MFI): TrB(•)VETERAN > TrB(•)NEW 
i) Trustee  contribution  H03
(MFI):  TeCVETERAN = TeCNEW  vs. HA3
(MFI):  TeCVETERAN > TeCNEW 
l)  Trustee first order belief  H04
(MFI):  FOB(•)VETERAN = FOB(•)NEW vs. HA4
(MFI): FOB(•)VETERAN > FOB(•)NEW
m)  Trustee second order belief H05
(MFI): SOB(•)VETERAN = SOB(•)NEW  vs. HA5
(MFI): FOB(•)VETERAN > FOB(•)NEW
As discussed in sections 5 and 6’s footnotes, we never accept the alternative hypothesis. Such evidence suggests that – in 
our sample – credit seniority (defined as we do it) does not significantly affect trust and trustworthiness behaviour.  
12 Extracted from the “microentrepreneurs’ stories” section of the Protagonizar handbook (2005)  
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Argentina), this non-profit foundation lends to support small businesses (bakeries, textile enterprises, 
beehives or basketworks) of poor microentrepreneurs
13. To achieve its aims Protagonizar placed its 
agencies in the three “villas” (densely populated sub-urban areas) of Santa Brigida, Barrio Mitre and Villa 
de Mayo. 
According to the organization its competitive advantage lies in the low operative costs (modest 
facilities, low installation and reduced functioning costs), in the closeness of the location to the 
borrowers and in the personalized attention to the borrowers of a group of motivated volunteers 
working together with the paid professional staff members.  
Protagonizar is also an interesting case of an organization which followed an opposite direction with 
respect to that of the Grameen, starting with staggered individual credits and moving almost entirely, after 
its first period of life, to a group lending mechanism with full joint liability.  
The  staggered individual credit mechanism creates a group of three entrepreneurs with independent 
projects and gives credit sequentially to each member of the group conditional to the repayment of the 
member who borrowed before. 
The group lending approach in Protagonizaris based on the creation of groups of 4-6 individuals to which 
money can be disbursed simultaneously. The full joint liability among members implies that, when one 
of them is unable to repay, the groupmates are called to cover that amount in full.  
Eligibility criteria in group lending require that borrowers i) must have a minimum six month enterprise 
experience, ii) cannot be relative but iii) must live at a maximum of three blocks of distance from each 
other (a rule which facilitates peer monitoring) and, in order to diversify risk within the group, iv) must 
have different business activities (only one street vendor per group is allowed). Finally, the coordinator 
of the group (one of the group members) is responsible for getting the money from the foundation, 
distributing it to the other members and collecting the installments on behalf of the lender. 
                                                 
13 See section 5 comments to Table 1.   
 
- 10 -
Under both (staggered individual and group) lending approaches, administrative costs charged by the 
Foundation are 5% monthly
14 over the debt balance.
 15 Repayments take place on weekly basis. 
Note that the Protagonizar group lending system has a three-sided screening process on the prospective 
borrower. The organization evaluates both the payment capacity of the client and the consideration that 
other bank borrowers (beyond groupmates) have of her. Finally, the group lending mechanism is 
expected to induce assortative matching so that, for groupmate-neighbours, trust on the borrower is 
not just declared in words but is demonstrated by accepting to create a group with her with a joint 
liability.  
As far as the microlender screening/monitoring activities are concerned, before getting the loan 
potential borrowers receive the visit of credit advisors and fill a questionnaire with socio-demographic 
and business information. After this, they receive the visit of credit counselors/advisors who assess 
their credit capacity. Credit counselors/advisors then make a proposal to the Credit Committee which 
almost always accepted. Once the money is received, counselors/advisors carry out post-credit visits to 
verify the money is being used for the purpose it was asked; there are also additional pesonalized-
monitoring visits on weekly basis. 
 
4.  The Experiment Design 
In what follows we describe the experiment design by sequentially focusing at the sampling 
scheme, the characteristics of the game, the matching procedure and the implementation. 
4.1 The sampling scheme prior to the experiment  
From a list of all the Protagonizar's beneficiaries, we randomly select 152 borrowers (in equal 
proportion from Barrio Mitre, Santa Brigida and Villa de Mayo) and split them into two equal-sized groups 
according to credit seniority (i.e. new vs. veteran MF borrowers) to enhance representativeness in this 
                                                 
14 Real interest rates seem high if we consider official but less if we consider unofficial inflation rates. Consider in 
 fact that several authors judge Argentinean poverty lines grossly undervalued due to a downward bias in computing 
domestic inflation.  One of the best known independent research centers, Ecolatina,  estimates that prices rose 65 percent 
from Dec. 1, 2006, to July 31, 2009, compared with the 20 percent increase calculated by the statistical institute (to follow 
this debate  see http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKQUiLozzZko and 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5joiySC_mXc). 




16. We use the credit cycle information (while not the time distance from the first loan) for the 
definition of borrowers' seniority since the former is better suited to proxy for borrowers' quality in 
terms of solvency. As a control sample, from the three areas of interest and according to the 
Protagonizar's eligibility rules, we randomly choose 152 eligible micro-entrepreneurs
17 who were neither 
borrowers of Protagonizar nor of any other MFI at the moment of the interview
18.  
Following the standard notation in the impact analysis literature, the group composed by the 152 MF 
borrowers will be referred to as the "treatment group", whereas the group of the 152 eligible non-
participants as the "control group". The selection of control group members according to the eligibility 
criteria allows us to reduce the potential heterogeneity between MF and non-MF individuals, thus 
moderating the impact of selection bias in our quasi-experimental framework.  
However, as it will be better specified in the next sections, a potential selection on unobservable 
characteristics is crucial neither for the robustness of our main proposition nor for our results.  
By focusing on the MF participation as a signal for trustworthiness, rather than on its general impact on 
welfare's quantitative indicators, the question of the exact direction of causality between trustworthiness 
and selection is not essential. In other terms, whether individuals were (or not) already trustworthy 
before joining Protagonizar does not alter the signaling effect that the loan concession generates on 
trustors.   
 
4.2The investment game   
The experiment is based on a standard two-player Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe, 1995). At the beginning of the game both players are endowed with 10 tokens. The exchange 
rate is 1 token per 2.5 pesos which corresponds to 0.5 euros as average exchange rate between the two 
                                                 
16 Specifically, borrowers' seniority is evaluated according to their credit-cycle. Since borrowers must first reimburse the 
previous loan in order to ask for a new one, a higher credit cycle is a proxy of a higher degree of borrower's solvency. Given 
a median credit-cycle of 17, borrowers with a credit-cycle higher than or equal to 17 are categorized as "veteran" while 
borrowers with a credit-cycle below the median as "new".  
17 Eligibility criteria are those described in section 3. Those applying for our experiment are: i) residence in the three districts 
in which the bank operates; ii) minimum six month enterprise experience. 
18 The proportion of borrowers from the three areas (S. Brigida, Mitre and Villa de Mayo) is the same among borrowers and 
eligible non participants.   
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currencies during the experiment period (August-September 2009).   
Differently from what usually happens in investment games played by students, and given the standard 
of living of borrowers in the area, the money at stake is not negligible. In facts, the maximum amount 
the trustor (trustee) can win in the game is 80 (85) pesos, which represents the 80% (85%) of the MF 
borrowers’ average weekly installment (100 pesos)
19. 
According to the standard version of the game, the first mover, the trustor, must decide how much of 
her endowment to send to the second mover, the trustee. The amount sent is tripled when delivered to 
the trustee, who must decide how much of the tripled sum to send back to the trustee (Figure 1). 
Assuming that players have purely self-interested preferences, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of 
this game is the strategy vector in which both players send zero to their counterpart.  
 
 
Our investment game has three specific features. First, players do not move simultaneously but, 
according to an ex-ante matching procedure which allows both of them to play twice, against a MF 
counterpart and against a non-MF one (see section 4.3). This allows us to capture within and not just 
                                                 
19 The realized average payoff of the game was 34.78 pesos, which is, in turn, around 35% of average weekly installment. 
Consider however that part of the payoff is not known to players before starting as it is represented by surprise questions on 
first and second order beliefs.  
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between effects. Second, we adopt the strategy method by asking to the trustee to illustrate her response 
conditional to any possible strategy chosen by the trustee. Third, we elicit through direct surprise 
questions first and second order trustee's beliefs and, finally, motivations of the choices of both players 
(see section 4.4). 
We combine the experimental analysis of the investment game with a survey aimed at collecting socio-
demographic characteristics and information about subjects’ attitudes, habits, feelings, satisfaction with 
their life and work, etc.
20 The information collected is used to build up control variables for the 
econometric estimation.   
 
4.3 The matching procedure 
All the selected individuals have been randomly divided into two macro-groups according to the 
role played in the game (152 trustors and 152 trustees). Each individual plays twice and the round order 
is randomly alternated. The game is played in anonymity so that players do not know their counterpart 
with the exception of her MF/non-MF borrower status (and below/above median MF seniority) 
revealed by the experimenter before the beginning of the game. To sum up, as far as the matching 
scheme is concerned, among the 152 trustors:  
-  76 are MF borrowers (38 new and 38 veterans) and each of them is matched with i) a non-MF 
trustee; ii) a MF trustee (randomly, new or veteran);   
-  76 are non-MF borrowers and each of them is matched with i) a non-MF trustee; ii) a MF 
trustee (randomly, new or veteran). 
Second, among the 152 trustees: 
-  76 are MF borrowers (38 new and 38 veterans) matched with i) a non-MF trustor; ii) a MF trustor  
(randomly, new or veteran); 
-  76 are non-MF entrepreneurs matched with i) a non-MF trustor; ii) a MF trustor (randomly, new 
or veteran). 
                                                 
20 Examples of studies based on this combination of classical surveys and experiments based on simple games are, among 
others, those of Glaeser et al.(2000) and Fehr et al. (2003).  
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The matching mechanism is summarized in the following table.  
 
TRUSTOR  MF TRUSTEE NON-MF TRUSTEE 
76 MF  








4.4 Implementation  
The field-experiment (June-September 2009) has been carried out by two couples of 
experimenters, each of them composed by a foreign researcher and a local field-assistant. The survey is 
in two steps: i) a brief questionnaire with questions on qualitative and quantitative wellbeing which is 
administered before the game; ii) the investment game. The game is carefully explained to the 
interviewees through a series of standardized instructions (which do not include simulations in order to 
avoid that players frame on some specific solutions). In order to avoid confounding discount rate 
effects, each player knows that she will receive the payment according to her payoff from only one of 
the two rounds (randomly chosen) and in 45 days from the interview.
21 However, given the non-
simultaneous structure of the game, neither the trustors nor the trustees know the exact payoff at the 
end of each round.   
The player is informed about the role she plays (trustor or trustee) in the whole game and - in each 
round - about the characteristics of her counterpart (i.e. (new or veteran) MF or non-MF borrower). For 
instance, in the first round she can play against a veteran MF borrower whereas, in the second round, 
with a non-MF micro-entrepreneur. In each round the player specifies how much she is willing to send 
(if she plays as trustor) or return (if she plays as trustee) to the counterpart.  
With regard to trustees we adopt the strategy method and ask in every round for their response strategy 
                                                 
21 Players were asked to come to Protagonizar's office 45 days after the interview to receive their payoff.   
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in correspondence of any trustor's possible move
22. This approach, typically used in many investment 
games
23, allows us to interview the trustees in a non-simultaneous framework and without a prior 
knowledge of the trustor choice. Moreover, this modification provides us also with a more accurate 
insight about the overall trustee's strategy not fully revealed when we just measure her response 
contingent to the actual trustor’s play.  
At the end of the two rounds, player's beliefs are elicited through an ex-post surprise question about 
how much they believe the counterpart has actually sent (if she plays as trustee) or returned (if she plays 
as trustor). Consistently with the literature, we will refer to the answers to those questions as first order 
beliefs. With another surprise question we ask trustees’ to guess what are the counterparts’ beliefs about 
their strategy, that is we elicit their second order beliefs
24. Answers on beliefs of both orders are 
remunerated by an additional payoff of 5 tokens (10 pesos) in case of correct guess
25.  
Finally, at the end of the game, both players are asked to select which motivation among the four listed 
alternatives better justifies their choices with respect to each round. With such a question we are able to 
grasp from an additional source of information the potential determinants of the players' strategy
26. 
 
5.  Descriptive findings and hypothesis testing 
Two first introductory tables (Tables 1 and 2)  illustrate characteristics of the respondents in our sample 
in aggregate and divided between MF borrowers and eligible non-participants.  
                                                 
22 The typical questions are: "How much do you send back to the trustor if he sends to you 2.5 pesos? How much if he sends 
5 pesos?...How about if  he sends all her  initial endowment of 25 pesos?" 
23 For a comparison of the strategy and game methods see, among others, Brandts and Charness (2000), Cason and Mui 
(1998), Oxoby and McLeish (2004) and Brosig et al. (2003). 
24 The question - repeated for every play - is: "in your opinion, how much the trustor think you will actually send back to her?" 
25 The literature is mixed on the use of point or interval elicitation of beliefs (see Blanco et al., 2008). Both of them have 
pros and cons. The limits of point elicitation is that the player may be discouraged to identify the correct guess when too 
many alternatives are provided. The limits of interval elicitation of beliefs is that it leads to strategic use of  beliefs. Consider 
a case in which the range of the possible counterpart choices is x ∈[A,B] and the bonus is given if the deviation between 
belief and choice is not larger than ± γ, if a player’s point guess of the counterpart choice is B (the upper interval of player’s 
choices) it is better to declare B-γ rather than B. As a consequence it can be typically observed an abnormal peak at B-γ  in 
the distribution of beliefs and this will make difficult to interpret the belief distribution. We opted for point elicitation of 
beliefs to avoid strategic elicitation and because the range of possible answers is not too large. 
26 As potential determinants of trustor’s strategy, we selected i) trust; ii) strategic altruism; iii) inequity aversion; iv) pure altruism. As 
determinants of trustee’s strategy, i) trustworthiness; ii) inequity aversion; iii) pure altruism; iv) (positive or negative) reciprocity.  
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Overall sample statistics document that the average respondents’ schooling level is quite low (8.4 years) 
and that of the partner is even lower (5.8 years). Average monthly household income is 4,096 pesos 
while median income is 3,000 pesos. This implies that half of sample household lives with around 100 
pesos per day. Since the median number of members of the household is around 4, interviewed 
individuals live on with roughly 12.29 PPP US$  per day.
27 
The average amount of last monthly repayment for the microfinance loan among MF borrowers is 108 
pesos, that is, 27 percent of median income. 
In spite of it around 20 percent of income is saved. Respondents have no temporary employees. 
Average total productivity (considering main and other jobs) is around 17 pesos per hour. 
When we decompose the sample in two groups (clients and eligible non participants), we find that 
eligible non participants have on average 73 percent of the monthly average household income of MF 
borrowers (the difference in means is however not significant at 95 percent). 
MF borrowers’ productivity
28 is 21 pesos per hour worked against 16 pesos of eligible non participants 
(again the difference in means is not significant at 95 percent).  
Interestingly, MF borrowers save relatively more (313.84 pesos) than eligible non participants (78.48 
pesos). Such a difference is perhaps due to the need MF borrowers have to save more in order to repay 
the debt.   
 
5.1 Trustors 
In both rounds of the game, the vast majority of trustors (81%) sent more than zero (the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game).  
                                                 
27 During the survey period (July-Sept. 2009), the average malnutrition and poverty thresholds were set by the INDEC 
(National Statistical Agency of Argentina) at 4.88 and 11.04 pesos/day respectively, which are in turn equivalent to 3.84 and 
8.70 PPP –US$ according the PPP country’s factor evaluated by the World Bank in 2005. When considering the country’s 
implied PPP factor in 2009 (US$ 2.033, source: IMF), both the malnutrition and poverty lines fall to 2.40 and 5.43 PPP-US$ 
per day respectively. However, if we correct these lines for the unofficial and more realistic inflation rates discussed at 
footnote  13 Protagonizar borrowers are much more closer to them.  
28 Measured as the ratio between respondent and her partner’s monthly income (from all their activities) and the hours they 
spend in each activity.  
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In Table 3.1 we report matrices of the average trustor contribution and belief about trustee response by 
trustor/trustee type. The mean amount of money sent by all trustors (irrespective of their MF/non-MF 
type) is 10.05 pesos, whereas the mean amount they expect from trustees is 13.74 pesos (Table 3.1). 
The table also shows that trustors give more (around 50 percent more), whatever their type, when the 
trustee is a MF borrower (around 12 pesos against 8 as overall sample average, 11.7 against 8.8 if they 
are not MF clients and 12 against 7.6 if they are MF clients). It is also clear that MF trustors do not give 
unconditionally more than non-MF trustors (the difference is small and in favour of non-MF trustors). 
Results on beliefs go in the same direction. This second important finding provides one possible 
explanation to the first finding on trustors’ choices. Trustors may give significantly more to MF trustees 
because they expect significantly more from them
29 (16 against 11 on average, with a similar difference 
when we consider only MF or non-MF trustors)
30.  
Figures 3a-3b provide additional information on these findings showing that the distribution of 
trustors’ contribution and expectations from MF and non-MF trustees first intersect at around 6 pesos. 
Our first two results on trustors behavior and beliefs are confirmed by within parametric as well non 
parametric tests. The difference for the same trustor when sending to a MF versus a non-MF trustee is 
3.6 pesos and significantly different from zero. This leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis H01 
with both parametric and on parametric tests (Table 3.3).The trustor expects that such difference will pay since, 
for the same trustor, the difference in the expected money returned by MF versus non-MF trustees is 
on average 5.42 pesos (rejection of the null hypothesis H02 with both parametric and non parametric 
tests, Table 3.3).  
We repeat the analysis considering the differences in MF seniority. Despite the presence of a small 
horizontal discrimination effect on MF status (trustors give more to the trustees who share the same 
                                                 
29 Such a behaviour is consistent with Ashraf et. al. (2006) findings that trust is highly correlated with an expectation of 
reciprocity, that is we give because we expect to receive. 
30 We verified whether MF seniority has an effect which is independent from the MF/non-MF status but we did not find 
significant results. Estimates are in Appendix (Tables A.4-A-5).  
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MF status), the within tests do not show significant differences on trustor’s contributions and 
expectations when both players’ MF seniority is accounted for.
31  
If we examine the main revealed motivation of the trustor’s choice we find that trust plus strategic trust 
(that is, the motivation that would be most suggested by choices and beliefs) does not exceed by far 
equality concerns. Data on revealed strategies are however less informative than those on beliefs and 
have the limit that only one motivation may be provided by each player. Even if a trustor reveals 
equality concerns as her main motivation, the fact of sending more and believing to receive more from 
MF trustee reveals that trustors, whatever their type, believe in the superior creditworthiness of MF 
versus non-MF trustee. 
 
5.2 Trustees 
Also for the trustee sub-population, the Nash behavior is seldom observed since players’ 
response to nonzero trustor’s contributions is zero only in two cases (1.3 percent of the sample). The 
mean amount returned by all the trustee-types as response strategy is 25.11 pesos, whereas the mean 
amount they expect from the trustor is 15.16 pesos (Table 4.1). 
Trustees give substantially more when they are MF clients whatever the trustor type. Remember that in 
this case we use the strategy method and therefore what we calculate here is the average of the ten 
possible trustee’s responses to the ten possible trustor’s plays. More specifically, the trustees give on 
average 21.3 pesos when not client, 30.1 when young clients and 28 when old clients.  The test on the 
difference sent when being a MF versus a non-MF trustee is significant (rejection of the null hypothesis 
H03 with both parametric and non parametric tests, Table 4.2).
32 
First order beliefs are consistent with the overall picture: trustees believe that trustors would give 
significantly more when they know that trustees are MF borrowers. Their belief is 12.5 in case of 
trustors knowing to play with non-MF trustees and rises to 17.3 and 18.3 when knowing to play with 
                                                 
31 Evidence is in Appendix (Table A.3).  
32 Again, we do not find here an increase in the contribution when moving from young to old clients. Neither we observe 
that the matching between old trustors and old trustees leads the trustees to give more;  while an amount of discrimination 
on MFI status is present, it is small in magnitude and vanishes when the trustee is an MFI veteran. The non parametric tests 
which account for trustee’s MFI seniority do not show significant differences in responses.  
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new and old MF trustees respectively. The MF/non-MF difference is significant in non parametric tests 
(rejection of the null hypothesis H04, Table 4.2) 
Second order beliefs are also consistent with the overall picture. Trustees believe that trustors believe 
that they will give more when being MF trustees. The difference is of more than 5 pesos (12.5 versus 
17.8) and is significant in the non parametric tests (rejection of the null hypothesis H05, Table 4.2). 
Figures 4a-4c provide additional information on these findings showing that distributions of non-MF 
trustee’s responses, first and second order expectations are always larger in the first part of the value 
interval and then smaller after the intersection (which occurs at 23 pesos for contributions, 16 and 17 
for first and second order beliefs respectively). 
Overall, these findings illustrate that trustees do not care about the trustor MF/non-MF characteristic 
in their choices
33 and beliefs. This result weakens the possible interpretation that the result on the 
higher trustors’ contribution to the MF trustee is due to a mere framing effect (that is, the fact that the 
only information about the counterpart we give is about her MF/non-MF status may, by itself, 
influence the player choice).  
What the trustees know when playing the game is whether the trustors are or  not (new or veteran) 
borrowers of the MFI (see section 4.3). But this information does not seem to affect their beliefs as it 
occurs for trustors when they learn about the same characteristic regarding the trustees.  
In essence, our result on trustees depends on their own characteristics and not on elements which are 
part of the description of the game. Hence the framing interpretation does not apply. And if the trustor 
behavior consistently anticipates a behavior of trustees, which does not depend on a framing effect, it is 
itself less likely to be affected by the framing effect as well
34. 
 
6.  Econometric findings 
                                                 
33 Obviously the use of the strategic method explains in large part why choices (but not why beliefs) are not affected.  
34 In other terms trustors should anticipate that trustees believe that they are affected by the framing effect and that trustees 
are not. This is quite implausible and however would limit the framing effect to the trustors’ behavior.  
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With econometric estimates we want to check whether our results on our five variables of 
interest (amount sent and first order belief of trustors, mean trustee response
35 and first and second 
order belief of trustees) are affected by socio-demographic factors or other measured controls. For 
each dependent variable we propose four estimates.  
The first estimate (Table 5, column 1) is specified as follows                         
   
TrustorSendi = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + εi
         (1) 
with the amount sent by trustors (TrustorSend) being the dependent variable.   Regressors are household’s 
income measured as the sum of each family member’s disposable income (HIncome), the number of 
individuals living in the house (HComponents), two village dummies (Village), the respondent’s years of 
schooling (Schooling), age, gender dummy (Female, equal to 1 if the interviewee is female), civil status
36 and 
job experience (JobExp), that is the number of years in the entrepreneurial activity financed by the 
loan
37.  
In the second specification (Table 5, column 2), we add two dummy variables for the player’s MF/non-
MF status, TrustorType and TrusteeType, which are equal to 1 if the player is a member of a MF institution 
and 0 otherwise. 
   
TrustorSendi = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + β12TrustorTypei + β13TrusteeTypei + εi
         (2) 
                                                 
35 The average of the ten possible trustee’s responses to the ten possible trustor’s plays. 
36 Specifically, the dummies used for civil status are Married, Cohabitant and Single; the banchmark dummy is Separated.  
37 Several studies have reported that socio-economic variables like the ones we include in our regression - age, gender, 
income, marital status, education and place of living - are correlated with trust (see, among others, Alesina and La Ferrara 
2000, Bellemare and Kroeger 2007, Rainer and Siedler 2006, Sutter and Kocher 2007). In particular, Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000) classify among the strongest factors that reduce trust the belonging to an historically discriminated group (such as 
minorities and women) and lack of success in terms of income and education. Sutter et al. (2006) argue that trust increases 
almost linearly from early childhood to early adulthood but stays rather constant within different adult age groups, whereas 
trustworthiness prevails in all adult age groups. Bellamare et al. (2006) find that heterogeneity in social capital behaviour is 
characterized by several asymmetries, that is men, the young and elderly, and low educated individuals invest relatively less, 
but reward significantly more investments. Finally, Moorman et al. (1993) argue that, among other interpersonal factors, 
expertise is a strong predictor for trust in market research relationships.  
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In the third and the fourth specifications, the last model is estimated in subgroups of MF (or non-MF) 
trustors only (Table 5, columns 3 and 4).   
Results from model 2 show that the trustor type variable is strongly significant with a magnitude of 
3.67 pesos (very close to the 4 pesos average effect in descriptive statistics) in the overall sample 
estimates. The effect is not only significant statistically but also economically since it corresponds to 
around 33 percent increase with respect the average contribution to a non-MF trustee. The variable 
remains significant in both sub-sample estimates. On the contrary, the MF borrower status does not 
matter when evaluating the trustor’s behavior. 
We propose the same four specifications when looking at the trustor’s beliefs (Table 6,columns 1, 2, 3 
and 4). More specifically, models 1 and 2 become: 
   
TrustorExpecti = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + εi
     (3) 
and 
   
TrustorExpecti = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + β12TrustorTypei + β13TrusteeTypei + εi
     (4) 
where TrustorExpect measures how much trustors expect to receive back from trustees.   
Our findings show that trustors expect their higher donation to MF trustees will pay since they expect 
from MF trustors 5.14 pesos more. The result is robust in trustor’s type sample splits (Table 6, columns 
3 and 4). No other controls matter in these estimates with the exception of the weak significance of 
household income (higher income players expecting slightly less from trustees). 
In Table 7 we repeat the same estimates for the trustee sample, considering as dependent variable the 
trustee’s mean response (TrusteeRESP) (see below)
38. 
                                                 
38 Specifications with observations including each elements of the trustee strategy are also estimated clustering for individual 
player variance. Results are as expected confirmed and stronger and are omitted for reasons of space. We repeated all the  
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TrusteeRESP i = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + εi
        (5) 
and  
   
TrusteeRESP i = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + β12TrustorTypei + β13TrusteeTypei + εi
        (6) 
Estimate results show that the mean trustee response is 7.50 pesos and higher if the trustee is a MF 
borrower (a 52 percent more with respect to what a non-MF trustee gives on average). The trustor’s 
type is not significant, consistently with what shown in descriptive statistics and non parametric tests 
(Table 7, columns 1 and 2). The result is robust in the (counterpart) trustor’s type splits (Table 7, 
columns 3 and 4). With regard to other controls it is interesting to see here that higher income trustees 
tend to give less, while females significantly more. The literature on gender effects in experimental 
games is quite mixed; however, a partial agreement seem to exist on the fact that women behave more 
socially in less risky situations
39.  
Tables 8 and 9 show estimate results when trustees’ first (Belief(I)) and second order (Belief(II)) beliefs are 
dependent variables 
   
Belief (I)i = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + β12TrustorTypei + β13TrusteeTypei + εi
     (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
specifications saturating the model with an interaction term between trustee and trustor MFI/non-MFI status. The 
additional regresssor was insignificant in all the specifications; results are omitted but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
39 For a non-exhaustive discussion on gender effects, look at Becchetti, et al. (2009) experiment based on traveller’s 
dilemma, where women in the sample reveal to be less trustful than men; Solnick (2001) shows that both women and men 
expect higher offers by a female proposer; Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) show that in a dictator game with asymmetric 
information men are more selfish; on the basis of Eckel and Grossman (1998) findings that women are more socially 
oriented in less risky situation, Croson and Buchan’s (1999) experiment based on a trust game reveals that they behave like 
men when they play as trustors but they are more generous when play as trustees. The last result, however, is not 
comparable with ours (in which women behave more generously) because participants to the Croson and Buchan’s (1999) 
(lab) experiment are undergraduate students at University of Melbourne, a very different sample from the one we have in 




   
Belief (II)i = β0 + β1HIncomei + β2HComponentsi + β jVillagej
j=3
4




∑ + β10JobExpi + β11Schoolingi + β12TrustorTypei + β13TrusteeTypei + εi
            (8) 
First order belief estimates are also consistent with descriptive statistics since trustees believe that 
trustors would give significantly more when they know that they are MF borrowers. The magnitude of 
the effect  is 5.6 pesos (Table 8, columns 1 and 2).  This finding is robust when we re-estimate the 
model in the two (MF and non-MF trustees) subsamples (Table 8, columns 3 and 4).   
The second order belief effect is again significant and robust in subsamples. Trustees believe that 
trustors believe that they will give more if they are MF trustees (Table 9, columns 1, 2, 3 and 4). Its 
magnitude (around 9.5 pesos) is around 2 pesos larger than the actual difference between the MF and 
non-MF trustee behavior. An interesting finding here is that this is the only case in which the trustor 
MF status seems to matter. Hence, trustees’ second order beliefs are significantly and positively affected 
by the MF trustor status.   
One might object to the interpretation of our findings that the presence of unknown interviewers leads 
(skeptical) players to react less truthfully in a game with pecuniary payoffs. Even if such an effect is 
present, it does not however explain why trustors - whatever type - give more to (expect more from) 
MF trustees and MF trustees’ response, I and II order beliefs are higher in comparison with their non-
MF peers.  
The same reasoning applies to the objection that in field experiments players tend to protect their 
reputation or impress the experimenter. This would not be able to explain the observed differences in 
players’ strategies based on MF/non-MF status. 
40    
 
7.  The causality nexus between being trustworthy and becoming a MF borrower 
                                                 
40 Finally, we repeat all the estimates introducing seniority dummies as additional regressors but the latter are not significant. 




Even though we claimed above that the causality nexus in the relationship between being 
trustworthy and becoming a MF borrower does not matter, we are however interested to know more 
about this nexus with IV estimates. In facts, one might object that trustworthiness stays the same 
before and after trustees enter microfinance and that our estimates overstate the MF-participation 
effect when trustor and trustee knew each other in advance. On the contrary, if they do not know each 
other, the horizontal trustworthiness externalities is fully determined by the MF loan concession 
whatever the causal link between trustworthiness and the loan. Hence, the objection applies only to 
cases in which there are no informational asymmetries between two individuals in the area. 
In this section we show the robustness of MF-trustee effect to IV estimations when controlling for 
selection on unobservables and reverse causality problems. 
The instrument we select is the geographical distance from the MFI. On logical grounds this variable 
does not affect directly borrowers trustworthiness while it affects her decision of becoming a MF 
borrower. To this respect consider that one of the rules in Protagonizar is that group borrowers must not 
live at a higher distance than three blocks from each other (and all of them must be in the three barrios 
in which Protagonizar’s local agencies work). Hence being closer to Protagonizar raises the probability of 
being included in a group but it is not expected to affect trust and trustworthiness. Consider that a 
possible objection that those who are closer to Protagonizar will be monitored more and this would 
affect their trustworthiness is highly implausible. Distances between borrowers are not so large and the 
Protagonizar program includes the same number of post loan visits for all borrowers, irrespective of their 
location. Consider also that borrowers’ job place often does not coincide with their home.  
From a statistical point of view we observe that the instrument is relevant since the F-test of the 
excluded instrument in the first stage regression rejects the null confirming that the instrument has a 
significant impact on the instrumented variables, net of the effect of other regressors (Table 10). 
The Stock and Yogo (2005) statistics allows us to test whether our instrument is weak. In essence, we 
test the null of a distortion of a given percentage (5, 10, 15 percent) with a Wald test on the TSLS 
estimator due to a downward bias of the estimated variance. The test value falls between the 15 percent  
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and the 10 percent threshold so that we have to reject the null that the size of the bias is at most 10 
percent but we do not reject that it is at maximum 15 percent. 
Due to the presence of these biases,  we  perform the Anderson – Rubin (1949) Wald test of 
robustness to the presence of weak instruments, where the null hypothesis is that the coefficient of the 
endogenous regressor in the structural equation is equal to zero. We reject the null that the coefficient 
is zero at 3 percent. 
Note that with a just identified model it is impossible to test for validity, that is, lack of correlation of 
the instrumental variable with the structural equation error. We must therefore proceed with intuition 
on this point as we did arguing about the intuitive absence of reverse causality or third omitted factors 
affecting both the instrument and the dependent variable. 
After these tests we find that the instrumented variable (MF borrower status of the trustee) is 
significant in the second stage estimate confirming the significance of the MF status effect on trustee’s 
response (Table 10) when endogeneity problems are taken into account. 
 
 
8.  Conclusions 
A fundamental characteristic of investment games is that trustees hold private information 
about their type, that is, trustors cannot discern the type of a trustee (Diekmann and Przepiorka, 2008). 
It is therefore clear that, if the trustee could signal her good quality type, this would potentially increase 
the total payoff of the game. In our field experiment on microfinance borrowers and eligible non-
participants we show that the problem can be solved by a “signaling technology” based on the 
revelation of the MF borrower status.  
We start from a theoretical framework in which loan concession may give a signal of trustworthiness of 
the MF borrowers and test this hypothesis finding results on players’ choices and beliefs which do not 
reject it.  
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We further argue that, if we reasonably consider the total payoff of the trust investment game as a 
proxy of the value added that can be created in business relationships, we may conclude that the MF 
loan concession is also a signal of trustworthiness that has, by itself, positive effects on economic 
activity and on the same capacity of the borrower to repay the loan.  
We believe that our findings illustrate one possible methodological solution to endogeneity problems in 
this kind of research. If we add an investment game experiment to the impact study on the effects of 
microfinance and test successfully that becoming a MF borrower generates trustworthiness (of the 
investment game type), we know that an important mechanism of direct causality between getting a MF 
loan and improving one’s own well being is at work. In other terms, if the MF loan concession event is 
something which produces a trustworthiness effect in the trust investment experiment, it is highly likely 
that the correlation we observe between loan concession and the actual borrower performance from 
the impact study contains that causal relationship from the first to the second fact. This implies that, 
even though we cannot exclude other direct or reverse causality patterns (or correlation with third 
omitted factors) in such correlation we have at least one causal relationship documenting that microfinance 
matters.   
In this respect however, an important question which can be assessed by future analyses following the 
same approach is whether our results rely on the specific group lending features of Protagonizar or can 
be generalized
41.  As we know from the literature (Ghatak, 1996) the mechanism of giving credit to 
groups of 4-6 individuals with joint liability and commitment of the group to cover fully the inability to 
pay of groupmates is a very strong incentive to assortative matching.  In the framework in which 
microfinance operates, with the impossibility of using scoring mechanisms used by traditional banks, 
peer monitoring reinforces bank screening and may create a much stronger trustworthiness effect.  
                                                 
41 It is important, however, to underline that in our experiment non-MF players are shortly informed before starting the 
game about the main characteristics of the MF institution (specifically about the group-lending mechanism and the interest 
rate). In doing that, a standardized written set of instruction is prepared in order to limit potential experimenters’ 
discretionality in selecting information on the MFI’s main features.  
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For this reason and to enrich the debate, implementation of other field-experiments are welcome in 
order to verify whether the same significant trustworthiness effect may be generated in presence of an 
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Table 1 – Summary statistics of Socio-Demographic and Economic Variables
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Age 361 43.19114 12.74666  17  79
Household Income (pesos)  361 4096.097 4922.754  150  65000
Household Food expenditure (pesos)  361 38.85286 30.12302  6.666667  400
Total Productivity* 361 17.3678 22.59894  0  312.5
Job Experience (years)  350 8.340974 8.728824  0.6  50
Savings/month (pesos)  361 186.0295 525.4139  0  5000
N. of persons in the house  360 4247911 1920876  1  15
N.of children  361 2.99169 2.135009  0  13
Schooling years (Respondent)  359 8.477716 3.054131  1  18
Schooling years (Partner)  361 5.587258 4.503548  0  18
Credit cycle  361 6.614958 8.687712  0  26
Total amount of last microcredit received  209 1086.158 647.1381 150  3000
Amount of last repayement 209 108.3245 64.54202  11  354
Duration of the microcredit (weeks)  209 10.85167 3.185304  4  30
*Income from first and second activity per hour worked 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for MF borrowers and eligible non participants 
     Eligible non participant     Clients 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Obs  Mean  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]
Age  152  43.68421  1.104722 41.5015    45.86692  150 42.53333  0.9579838  40.64034    44.42632 
Household Income  152  3662.599  462.1428 2749.497      4575.7  150 4982.687  387.5127  4216.956    5748.417 
Household Food 
expenditure  152  42.29793  3.249835 35.87691    48.71895  150 35.89159  1.725943  32.4811    39.30207 
Total Productivity  152  15.79351  2.223757 11.39981    20.18721  150 20.60705  1.636741  17.37283    23.84127 
Job Experience (years)  152  7.447368  0.684113 6.095699    8.799038  147 9.390476  0.7362667  7.935359    10.84559 
N. of temporary 
employess  152  0.0263158  0.0130265 .000578    .0520536  150 0.06  0.0254358  .0097385    .1102615 
Savings/month  152  78.48684  25.43209 28.23815    128.7355  150 313.8444  57.65782  199.9118    427.7771 
N. of persons in the 
house  150  4.013333  0.1608108 3.695569    4.331098  150 4.44  0.1529662  4.137737    4.742263 
N.of children  152  2.519737  0.1600503 2.20351    2.835964  150 3.253333  0.169797  2.917812    3.588854 
Schooling years 
(Respondent)  150  8.9  0.2614278 8.383415    9.416585  150 8.403333  0.2370445  7.93493    8.871736 
Schooling years (Partner)  152  5.828947  0.3903659 5.057663    6.600232  150 5.28  0.3360675  4.615926    5.944074 
Credit cycle            150 15.76  0.4911458  14.78949    16.73051 
Total amount of last 
microcredit received            150 1209.513  52.15598  1106.452    1312.574 
Amount of last 
repayment            150 121.1681  5.290582  110.7139    131.6224 
Duration of the 








 Table 3.1 - Trustor’s contributions   Figure 2 - Distribution of trustor’s motivations 









The  first number in the cell is the amount in pesos 
sent by trustors, whereas the second is the amount 






Table 3.2 - Hypothesis testing on trustors’ contribution and beliefs 
Test type 
Average 
difference z- stat  p-value 
Parametric tests       
Within test on trustor contribution to a MF vs. a non-
MF trustee  (Hyp. H01)  3.76 4.64  (0.00) 
Within test on trustor expectations from a MF vs. a non-
MF trustee (Hyp. H02)  5.42 4.86  (0.00) 
Non parametric tests       
Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test on trustor’s contribution 
to a MF vs a non-MF trustee (Hyp. H01)   -4.26  (0.00) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test on trustor’s expectation 
from a MF vs a non-MF trustee (Hyp. H02)   -3.77  (0.00) 
      
 
 













Trustee  Trustor 
Non-MF  MF  Total 
8.83  11.70  10.26  Non-MF 
11.53  16.46  14.06 
7.57  12.07  9.82  MF 
10.65  15.87  13.41 
8.21  11.88  10.05  Total 
11.10  16.16  13.74  
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Table 4.1–Trustee’sresponse,   Figure 4 - Distribution of trustee’s motivations 












The  first number in the cell is the trustee’s 
response in pesos to trustors’ hypothetical 
strategies, whereas the second and the third one 
represent the I and the II order beliefs 





Table 4.2 -Hypothesis testing on trustee’s response, I and II order beliefs 
Test type 
Average 
difference z- stat  p-value 
Parametric tests       
Within test on trustee’s response to a MF vs. a non-MF 
trustor (Hyp. H03)  -0.90 -1.48  (0.14) 
Within test on trustee’s I-order belief on a MF vs. a non-
MF trustor move (Hyp. H04)  1.81 1.64  (0.10) 
Within test on trustee’s II-order belief on a MF vs. a 
non-MF trustor move (Hyp. H05)  3.56 1.32  (0.007) 
Non parametric tests       
Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test on trustee’s response by 
MF vs a non-MF trustee (Hyp. H03)   -4.73  (0.00) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test on trustee’s I order 
belief by MF vs a non-MF trustee (Hyp. H04)   -4.139  (0.00) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test on trustee’s II order 
belief by MF vs a non-MF trustee (Hyp. H05)   -3.635  (0.0003) 
 
 
        Trustor   Trustee  
Non-MF  MF  Total 
21.54  20.80  21.17 
11.46  13.53  12.49  Non-MF 
12.17  16.53  14.35 
29.58  28.51  29.04 
17.15  18.47  17.81  MF 
21.93  24.51  23.24 
25.56  24.66  25.11 
14.30  16.02  15.16  Total 







































Table 5 – Determinants of trustor’s contribution (OLS estimates) 
Whole sample  Non –MF Trustors only MF Trustors only   
  1  2  3  4 
Age  0.0449 0.0444 0.0202 0.0705 
  (0.0514) (0.0520) (0.0647) (0.0789) 
Female  -0.596 -0.535 0.556 -1.771 
  (1.207) (1.233) (1.518) (2.115) 
Single  -0.640 -0.626 1.106 -2.883 
  (2.065) (2.078) (3.550) (2.617) 
Married  -1.878 -1.883 0.938 -4.403* 
  (1.699) (1.709) (2.689) (2.442) 
Cohabitant  -1.219 -1.222 0.292 -2.542 
  (1.904) (1.914) (2.851) (2.603) 
JobExp  0.0123 0.0147 0.0752 -0.0853 
  (0.0631) (0.0643) (0.0898) (0.0996) 
Villa de Mayo  0.886 0.653 0.859  
  (1.526) (1.647) (1.789)  
S. Brigida  1.479 1.476 1.672 1.338 
  (1.253) (1.254) (2.005) (1.947) 
Schooling  -0.0673 -0.0676 -0.206 -0.0122 
  (0.191) (0.192) (0.272) (0.274) 
HIncome  -0.000143* -0.000140* -0.000114 -0.000101 
  (8.15e-05) (8.22e-05) (0.000196) (9.91e-05) 
HComponents  0.517 0.507 0.852* 0.185 
  (0.331) (0.337) (0.454) (0.527) 
TrustorType  -0.351  
  (1.230)  
TrusteeType  3.670*** 2.862*** 4.500*** 
  (0.705) (1.053) (0.969) 
  
Observations  300 300 152 148 
R-squared  0.032 0.087 0.092 0.146 
        
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses    




Table 6 – Determinants of trustor’s expectations (OLS estimates) 
Whole sample  Non –MF Trustors only MF Trustors only   
1  2  3   4 
Age  0.0190 0.0181 0.0754 -0.0632 
  (0.0960) (0.0935) (0.0972) (0.201) 
Female  -1.339 -1.533 1.820 -4.835 
  (2.731) (2.968) (2.673) (5.762) 
Single  2.629 2.667 6.782 -2.931 
  (5.753) (5.777) (6.540) (7.966) 
Married  -2.854 -2.927 2.922 -8.857 
  (3.651) (3.626) (3.870) (6.246) 
Cohabitant  -3.296 -3.311 2.050 -8.994 
  (4.479) (4.466) (3.631) (8.122) 
JobExp  0.0590 0.0505 0.200* -0.174 
  (0.0835) (0.0860) (0.115) (0.137) 
Villa de Mayo  3.824 4.359 4.824 0 
  (3.291) (3.431) (3.572) (0) 
S. Brigida  3.298 3.285 4.658 1.957 
  (2.262) (2.255) (3.020) (2.691) 
Schooling  -0.233 -0.239 -0.462 -0.241 
  (0.406) (0.408) (0.455) (0.822) 
HIncome  -0.000258** -0.000257* -3.87e-05 -0.000210 
  (0.000122) (0.000130) (0.000301) (0.000133) 
HComponents  0.740 0.779 1.511 0.0784 
  (0.686) (0.688) (1.035) (0.882) 
TrustorType  0.575  
  (2.377)  
TrusteeType  5.144*** 4.955** 5.569*** 
  (1.213) (1.997) (1.403) 
        
Observations  278 278 140 138 
R-squared  0.039 0.069 0.123 0.100 
        
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses 




Table 7 – Determinants of trustee’s response (OLS estimates) 
Whole sample  Non –MF Trustor only MF Trustor only   
1  2  3   4  
Age  0.0437 0.0422 0.0639 0.0206 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.112) (0.107) 
Female  5.975*** 4.967** 5.012** 4.923** 
  (2.170) (2.079) (2.307) (2.176) 
Single  1.280 1.663 1.728 1.598 
  (4.232) (4.194) (4.482) (4.400) 
Married  3.450 4.050 3.982 4.117 
  (3.757) (3.700) (3.973) (3.904) 
Cohabitant  1.232 0.580 1.920 -0.759 
  (4.224) (4.125) (4.492) (4.344) 
JobExp  -0.0759 -0.135 -0.159 -0.112 
  (0.139) (0.140) (0.149) (0.141) 
Villa de Mayo  -7.744** -2.371 -4.913 0.171 
  (3.643) (3.949) (4.334) (4.118) 
S. Brigida  -1.277 0.297 0.923 -0.329 
  (2.543) (2.490) (2.636) (2.578) 
Schooling  0.282 0.250 0.277 0.222 
  (0.353) (0.336) (0.383) (0.330) 
HIncome  -0.000257** -0.000296*** -0.000272*** -0.000320*** 
  (0.000106) (0.0000994) (0.000103) (0.000112) 
HComponents  0.676 0.327 0.498 0.156 
  (0.720) (0.735) (0.772) (0.751) 
TrustorType  -0.903  
  (0.601)  
TrusteeType  7.501*** 6.756*** 8.246*** 
  (2.295) (2.442) (2.382) 
        
Observations  304 304 152 152 
R-squared  0.087 0.142 0.141 0.153 
        
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses    




Table 8 – Determinants of trustee’s I-order beliefs (OLS estimates) 
All sample  Non –MF Trustor only MF Trustor only   
1  2  3   4  
Age  -0.0550 -0.0551 0.0123 -0.122 
  (0.0806) (0.0809) (0.0886) (0.0903) 
Female  -0.861 -1.632 -2.027 -1.247 
  (1.615) (1.432) (1.489) (2.015) 
Single  -0.791 -0.676 -1.726 0.373 
  (2.914) (2.872) (2.952) (3.602) 
Married  0.272 0.703 -1.934 3.331 
  (2.552) (2.599) (2.382) (3.893) 
Cohabitant  -0.877 -1.303 -1.556 -1.051 
  (2.679) (2.676) (2.876) (3.193) 
JobExp  0.0458 0.00252 0.0804 -0.0757 
  (0.113) (0.116) (0.0995) (0.186) 
Villa de Mayo  -2.730 1.353 4.819 -2.110 
  (2.340) (2.437) (2.981) (3.503) 
S. Brigida  -2.341 -1.064 -0.117 -2.017 
  (1.802) (1.645) (1.557) (2.371) 
Schooling  0.0146 -0.00630 0.236 -0.248 
  (0.268) (0.253) (0.247) (0.352) 
HIncome  1.00e-04 7.05e-05 0.000142* -1.56e-06 
  (6.85e-05) (5.97e-05) (7.62e-05) (0.000123) 
HComponents  0.145 -0.114 0.496 -0.724 
  (0.395) (0.439) (0.327) (0.743) 
TrustorType  1.695  
  (1.140)  
TrusteeType  5.626*** 5.423*** 5.838** 
  (1.735) (1.550) (2.663) 
  
Observations  299 299 149 150 
R-squared  0.019 0.069 0.147 0.076 
        
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses    




Table 9 – Determinants of trustee’s II-order beliefs (OLS estimates) 
All sample  Non –MF Trustor only  MF Trustor only  
1  2  3  4 
Age  -0.138 -0.141 -0.193  -0.0865
  (0.146) (0.144) (0.158)  (0.167)
Female  -1.942 -3.192 -1.332  -5.087
  (3.447) (3.273) (3.366)  (3.782)
Single  -7.296 -7.948 -8.474  -7.370
  (5.024) (5.019) (5.263)  (5.843)
Married  -2.538 -2.018 -3.634  -0.433
  (4.559) (4.390) (4.680)  (4.790)
Cohabitant  -0.492 -1.063 -6.225  4.111
  (7.006) (6.773) (6.851)  (7.933)
JobExp  0.200 0.119 0.0188  0.222
  (0.230) (0.235) (0.200)  (0.344)
Villa de Mayo  -5.895* 1.015 2.684  -0.593
  (3.450) (3.826) (5.280)  (4.432)
S. Brigida  0.00511 1.768 0.156  3.376
  (3.375) (3.552) (4.095)  (3.692)
Schooling  0.182 0.0714 0.0368  0.121
  (0.414) (0.427) (0.469)  (0.519)
HIncome  8.57e-05 5.54e-05 0.000139  -2.65e-05
  (0.000103) (0.000142) (0.000103)  (0.000220)
HComponents  -0.00783 -0.541 -0.198  -0.831
  (0.585) (0.687) (0.701)  (0.842)
TrustorType  3.442***  
  (1.301)  
TrusteeType  9.388** 8.654**  10.21**
  (3.715) (4.167)  (3.987)
  
Observations  278 278 140  138
R-squared  0.032 0.081 0.060  0.122
       
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      





Table 10– Determinants of trustee’s response (2SLS estimates) 
Instrumented Variable: TrusteeType 
Instrument: 
Distance from the MF 
institution  
TrusteeType  33.73* 
  (19.03) 
Age  0.0371 
  (0.112) 
Female  1.443 
  (3.601) 
Single  3.002 
  (4.385) 
Married  6.146* 
  (3.715) 
Cohabitant  -1.700 
  (4.245) 
JobExp  -0.343 
  (0.210) 
Villa de Mayo  16.42 
  (13.93) 
S. Brigida  5.803 
  (4.677) 
Schooling  0.136 
  (0.328) 
HIncome  -0.000432* 
  (0.000236) 
HComponents  -0.895 
  (1.124) 
TrustorType  -0.903 
  (2.032) 
  
Observations  304 
R-squared  -0.518 
  
Exogeneity Test    
Chi-Square 1.771 
P-Value 0.183 
Test of Excluded Instruments (Weak Ident. Test)  
F-Stat. 3.704 




Distance is measured in cuadras: 1 cuadra = 0.13 Km 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses 





a) ANALYSIS OF MF-SENIORITY EFFECTS 
 
 
Table A.1  Table A.2 
Trustee  Trustor 
Non-MF New-MF Senior-MF 
Total
8.83  11.84 11.51  10.27 Non-MF 
11.53  14.87 18.43  14.06
8  11.25 11.13  9.53 New-MF 
9.54  8.75 13.58  11.41
7.23  12.60 15.62  10.07 Senior-MF 
11.80  18 20  15.32
8.21  12.17 11.58 10.05 Total 










Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test  z- stat  p-value 
on trustor's contribution to a MF trustee by 
trustee’s seniority  0.216 (0.8289) 
on MF trustor's contribution by trustor’s 
seniority  1.374 (0.1695) 
on trustee's response to a MF trusteor by trustor’s 
seniority  0.759   (0.4476) 






Trustor  Trustee 
Non-MF New-MF Senior-MF 
Total
21.54 21.68  20.80  21.175
11.46 11.92  13.53  12.49 Non-MF 
12.17 14.13  16.53  14.35
30.40 36.18  29.25  30.10
14.87 22.5  19.64  17.34 New-MF 
24.93 72.5  24.04  25.90
28.80 27.55  23.95  28.04
19.25 17.84  10  18.25 Senior-MF
19.40 23.55  9.17  25.90
25.56 24.95  24.35 25.11
14.30 14.96  17.15 15.16 Total 




Table A.4 - Determinants of Trustors’ game: analysis of MF seniority. 
Dep. Variables  TrustorSend  TrustorExpect  TrustorSend  TrustorExpect 
Sample  restricted to:  MF Trustors  MF Trustees  MF Trustees  MF Trustors 
Age  0.0621  0.0925  -0.0588  0.0970 
  (0.0775)  (0.0627)  (0.200)  (0.113) 
Female  -1.801  -0.423  -4.820  -3.462 
  (2.079)  (1.535)  (5.811)  (3.858) 
Single  -2.655  -0.331  -3.031  3.807 
  (2.713)  (2.400)  (8.177)  (6.663) 
Married  -4.141  -1.998  -8.958  -2.617 
  (2.488)  (1.904)  (6.473)  (4.028) 
Cohabitant  -2.348  -0.856  -9.083  -2.016 
  (2.712)  (2.183)  (8.311)  (5.026) 
JobExp  -0.0853  0.0357  -0.173  0.0347 
  (0.0984)  (0.0662)  (0.138)  (0.104) 
Villa de Mayo    1.592    8.941* 
    (2.120)    (5.322) 
S. Brigida  0.610  2.434  2.302  5.436* 
  (1.911)  (1.545)  (3.404)  (2.894) 
Schooling  -0.0426  -0.169  -0.220  -0.677 
  (0.285)  (0.220)  (0.859)  (0.571) 
HIncome  -8.42e-05  -0.000272*** -0.000218  -0.000409*** 
  (9.80e-05)  (7.85e-05)  (0.000140)  (0.000140) 
HComponents  0.161  0.390  0.0942  0.949 
  (0.520)  (0.371)  (0.867)  (0.967) 
TrusteeType  4.500***    5.550***   
  (0.972)    (1.411)   
TrustorSenior  -2.212    1.028   
  (1.997)    (3.996)   
TrustorType    0.902    2.985 
    (1.512)    (2.885) 
TrusteeSenior    -0.957    -0.968 
    (1.302)    (2.971) 
      
Observations  148  150  138  145 
R-squared  0.156  0.090  0.100  0.081 
        
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses    





Table A.5 -  Determinants of Trustees’ game: analysis of MF seniority. 
Dep. Variables   TrusteeRESP  Beliefs(I)  Beliefs(II)  TrusteeRESP Beliefs(I)  Beliefs(II) 
Sample  restricted to:  MF Trustors  MF Trustees MF Trustors MF Trustees MF Trustors  MF Trustees
Age  0.0635  0.155  0.0160  -0.0339  -0.192  -0.128 
  (0.112)  (0.175)  (0.0889)  (0.115)  (0.165)  (0.273) 
Female  5.011**  6.725*  -1.998  -2.142  -1.320  -2.425 
  (2.316)  (3.387)  (1.474)  (2.331)  (3.478)  (6.592) 
Single  1.749  6.055  -1.891  2.366  -8.513*  -13.25 
  (4.520)  (6.017)  (2.932)  (4.574)  (5.137)  (8.929) 
Married  4.001  11.38**  -2.101  3.040  -3.652  -5.748 
  (4.011)  (5.018)  (2.393)  (4.909)  (4.641)  (7.878) 
Cohabitant  1.947  6.734  -1.825  0.280  -6.254  0.847 
  (4.531)  (5.918)  (2.827)  (4.083)  (6.652)  (12.34) 
JobExp  -0.157  -0.296  0.0668  -0.127  0.0161  0.153 
  (0.150)  (0.182)  (0.0996)  (0.183)  (0.218)  (0.328) 
Villa de Mayo  -4.948    5.117*    2.744   
  (4.380)    (2.953)    (5.436)   
S. Brigida  0.850  1.123  0.555  0.136  0.257  5.035 
  (2.759)  (3.413)  (1.481)  (2.156)  (4.755)  (6.397) 
Schooling  0.276  -0.425  0.244  -0.115  0.0357  -0.189 
  (0.386)  (0.547)  (0.247)  (0.372)  (0.475)  (0.726) 
HY  -0.000271**  -0.000142  0.000133  -1.50e-05  0.000138  -0.000337
  (0.000106)  (0.000598) (8.24e-05)  (0.000266) (0.000101)  (0.000635)
Components  0.502  0.484  0.457  -0.801  -0.207  -1.693 
  (0.769)  (1.482)  (0.338)  (0.849)  (0.746)  (1.267) 
TrusteeType  6.737***    5.560***    8.691**   
  (2.457)    (1.552)    (4.286)   
TrustorSenior  -0.208    1.963    0.312   
  (2.366)    (1.388)    (4.339)   
TrustorType    -1.068    1.320    2.459 
    (0.925)    (2.064)    (1.870) 
TrusteeSenior    -2.072    0.334    -4.608 
    (3.190)    (2.162)    (5.855) 
            
Observations  152  152  149  150  140  146 
R-squared  0.141  0.149  0.158  0.028  0.060  0.077 
         
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses        











b) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
C CU UE ES ST TI IO ON NA AR RI IO O   P PR RO OT TA AG GO ON NI IZ ZA AR R   
1  Numero en lista                            
Grupo_________________  Eligible no-participantes - no otra imf 
(1)                       
   clientes 2)                       
2 
   salieron de Protagonizar (3)                       
Barrio  Mitre (1)                         
   Santa Brígida (2)                         
3 
   Villa de Mayo (3)                         
                                
Sexo  Masculino (0)                          4 
   Femenino (1)                         
5  Edad                            
Estado Civil  Soltero (1)                         
   Casado (2)                         
   Viudo (3)                         
   Divorciado (4)                         
   Separado (5)                         
6 
   Concubino (6)                         
7  Distancia (cuadras) de Protagonizar (o la IMF más 
cercana en caso de non-imf)  cuadras                       
8  Distancia del negocio a la 
calle principal  cuadras                         
9  Usted cuánta estatura mide?  cm                         
                                
SATISFACCIÓN DE VIDA 
Comparado con sus vecinos del barrio, cómo considera 
su nivel de vida?                           10 
   Mucho mejor (4)                         44 
 
   Mejor (3)                         
   Igual (2)                         
   Más bajo (1)                         
   Mucho más bajo (0)                         
11  Qué tan satisfecho se encuentra con su vida? (1-
totalmente insatisfecho, 10- totalmente satisfecho)  0-10                        
12  Qué tan satisfecho está con las condiciones de su 
vivienda?  0-10                        
13  Qué tan buen trabajador se 
considera?    0-10                        
14  En su opinión, cuánto debería ser su salario mensual 
para vivir satisfactoriamente?  $                         
                                        
CAPITAL SOCIAL 
                                        
En cuáles de los siguientes 
grupos participa?                            
   Grupos deportivos (1)                         
   Grupos vecinales (2)                         
  
Grupos o asociaciones 
religiosas (3)                         
  
Organizaciones 
comunitarias / civiles 
(ONGs) (4)
                        
  
Grupos culturales 
(música, danza, etc) (5)                         
   Partidos políticos (6)                         
  
Otro (especifique cual) 
(7)                         
15 
   Nada (0)                         
16  Votó en la elección anterior 
(local o nacional)?  Si [1] No [0]                           
17  Alguna vez ha pedido a sus 
vecinos que cuiden de sus 
niños? 
Si [1] No [0]                          
18  Alguna vez ha pedido ayuda a 
sus vecinos?  Si [1] No [0]                                  
                                
CARACTERÍSTICAS Y ACTIVOS DEL HOGAR 45 
 
19  Cuántas personas viven regularmente en su casa?  n.                       
Usted es:  Propietario de la vivienda y el 
terreno  (1)                       
   Propietario de la vivienda pero 
ocupante del terreno (2)                       
   Ocupante de la vivienda y el terreno 
(3)                       
   Alquila (4)                       
   Ocupante por prestamo (5)                       
20 
   Otro (6)_____________                       
Como es su vivienda (la 
casa)? 
Casa de ladrillo o bloques sin 
terminar (1)                       
   Casa de ladrillo o bloques terminada 
(2)                       
   Casilla de madera (3)                       
   Chapas (4)                       
   mixta terminada (5)                       
21 
   mixta noterminada (6)                       
22  Cuántas habitaciones se usan 
para dormir?  n.                         
Qué tipo de piso tiene la 
casa?  Tierra (1)                         
   Cemento (2)                         
   Tabas de madera (3)                         
   Ceramica (4)                         
23 
   Otro (5)______                         
Qué combustible usa su 
familia para cocinar?  Gas de garrafa (1)                         
   Electricidad (2)                         
   Kerosene (3)                         
   Leña o carbón (4)                         
   Gas natural (5)                         
24 
   Otro (Especifique) 
(6)________                         
La vivienda tiene baño  Con arrastre de agua (1)                          25 
   Letrina (sin arrastre de 
agua) (2)                         46 
 
   No tiene baño (3)                         
   Comparte el baño con 
vecinos (4)                         
   Otro (5)______                         
Cuáles de los siguientes 
objetos posee su familia?                              
a  Reloj  Si [1] No 
[0]                        
b  Radio / reproductor CD Si [1] No 
[0]                        
c  heladera Si [1] No 
[0]                        
d  TV Si [1] No 
[0]                        
e  Reproductor DVD/VCR Si [1] No 
[0]                        
f  Máquina de coser Si [1] No 
[0]                        
g  Herramientas  Si [1] No 
[0]                        
h  Bicicleta Si [1] No 
[0]                        
i  Motocicleta Si [1] No 
[0]                        
j  Automóvil Si [1] No 
[0]                        
k  Camion Si [1] No 
[0]                        
l  Computadora Si [1] No 
[0]                        
m  Teléfono de linea Si [1] No 
[0]                        
n  Celular (móvil) Si [1] No 
[0]                        
26 
o  Conexión a internet Si [1] No 
[0]                               
                                        
SALUD Y EDUCACIÓN 
27  Sabe usar la computadora?  Si [1] No [0]                          
28  Es usuario de internet?  Si [1] No [0]                          
                                
   tabla de educacion  Entrevistado Pareja                       
29-
30 
Cuántos años asistió a la 
escuela?                            47 
 
31-
32  Cuál es el máximo grado que 




2 = secundario 
completo 
3 = terciario 
completo            
                                
33  Cuántos hijos tiene? (llenar la 
tabla abajo)  Número                          
      34 35 36 37 38  39 40 41 42 43 44    
Actividades       
TABLA DE HIJOS  Sexo = Hombre (0) -  
























a las dos 
actividades
Distancia 
de la   




a  Primero                            
b  Segundo                            
c  Tercero                            
d  Cuarto                            
e  Quinto                            
f  Sexto                            
g  Séptimo                            
h  Octavo                            
                                     
Dónde nació su último hijo?                                 
En casa (1)                                 
En una clínica privada (2)                            
En el hospital (3)                            
45 
Otro (Especifique) 
(4)_____________                            
46  Su último  hijo fue vacunado?  Si [1] No [0]                          
47  Perdió a algunos de sus 
hijos?  n.                          
48  Usted se ha lastimado 
seriamente en el último año? 
(acc. de trabajo) 
Si [1] No [0]                          
49  Cuántas veces ha asistido al 
doctor en el último año?  n.                          
50  Cuántos días ha estado enfermo sin poder ir a trabajar 
en el último año?                          48 
 
                                
GASTOS DEL HOGAR 
                                        
51  ¿Cuánto gastó durante el último mes en que sus hijos 
asistieron a la escuela (cuotas, uniformes, libros, 
materiales escolares, transporte, etc) 
$ por 
mes                        
52  Cuánto gastó en cuestiones de salud durante el último 




                      
53  ¿Cuánto gastó el último año en cuidado dental para la 
familia? 
$ por 
ano                        
54  ¿Comúnmente cuánto gasta en comida para la familia 
diariamente?  $ por dia                        
                                        
INGRESO DEL HOGAR 
                                        
Cuál es su principal 
ocupación?                            
Nada/desempleado (1)                            
Tabajo ocasional / changas (2)                            
Trabajo asalariado (3)                            
Negocio proprio (4)                            
55 
Otro (especifique,ej. Plan 
trabajar) (5)________                            
Si 55 = Negocio propio, 
especificar el rubro del 
negocio 
NÚMERO                         
1. Albañil/pintor   2. Cestería                         
3. Cocinero/gastronómico   4. Talabartería                         
5. Remis   6. Electricista                          
7. Herrero   8. Jardinero/parquista                          
9. Mecánico   10. Modista/costurera                          
11. Tejedora   12. Revendedora ropa                          
13. Peluquería   14. Plomero/gasista                          
15. Kiosco   16. Almacen                          
56 
17. Peluches   18. Escobas                          49 
 
19. Reventa art limpieza   20. Pasto                          
21. Apicultura   22. 
Otros________________                          
Además de ésta, tiene otra actividad? (si tiene más de una, 
registrar la que genere la mayor parte del ingreso mensual)                        
   Nada/desempleado (1)                          
   Tabajo ocasional / 
changas (2)                         
   Trabajo asalariado (3)                         
   Negocio proprio (4)                         
   Otro (especifique) 
(5)________                         
                             
57 
   58 59 60 61                   
  
Tabla de actividades del 








                  
a  Principal actividad                             
b  Actividad Secundaria                             
                                
Cuál es la principal ocupación 
de su pareja?                                
   Nada/desempleado (1)                            
   Tabajo ocasional / 
changas (2)                            
   Trabajo asalariado (3)                         
   Negocio proprio (4)                         
62 
   Otro (especifique) 
(5)________                         
Además de ésta, tiene otra actividad? (si tiene más de una, 
registrar la que genere la mayor parte del ingreso mensual)                        
   Nada/desempleado (1)                         
   Tabajo ocasional / 
changas (2)                         
   Trabajo asalariado (3)                         
   Negocio proprio (4)                         
63 
   Otro (especifique) 
(5)________                         50 
 
                                
      64 65 66 67                   
  
Tabla de actividades de la 








                  
a  Principal actividad                             
b  Actividad Secundaria                             
                                 
68  Cuál es el ingreso mensual de 
la familia?                            
a  Entrevistado  $                          
b  Pareja  $                          
c  Hijos e hijas  $                                  
d  Otros miembros  $                                  
Tiene otras fuentes de ingreso? (donaciones, subsidios, 
etc)                          
no (0)                             
De la comunidad (1)                             
Del gobierno (2)                             
De personas privadas (3)                             
De organizaciones civiles 
(ONGs) (4)                             
Alquiler (5)                             
69 
Otro (Especifique) 
(6)________________________                             
Recibe donaciones en especie 
de:                             
no recibo (0)                             
Programas de gobierno (ej. 
Tarjeta del plan) (1)                             
ONGs (2)                             
Familiares (3)                             
Amigos / vecinos (4)                             
70 
Otro (Especifique) (5)_______                             51 
 
                                         
SERVICIOS FINANCIEROS 
                                        
      71 72 73 74 75  76 77 78 79 80 81  82 
Solicitado  Recibido









































Ha recibido o pedido 
préstamos en los últimos tres 
años? De quién? 
Si [1] No [0]  Si [1] No 
[0]  % semanal $  $  semanas Si [1] No 
[0]  Si [1] No [0]  Si [1] No 






a  Protagonizar (Si el entrevistado 
es participante)                               
c  Familiares                             
d  Conocidos / vecinos/ amigos                             
e  Cooperativas de ahorro y crédito                             
f  ONGs                             
g  Comerciante o proveedor                             
h  Banco Privado                             
i  Instituciones financieras de 
gobierno                             
l  Otros prestamistas privados                             
m  Otros prestamistas financieras                             
n  Otro (especifique)                             
Razones para obtener crédito de esa fuente (pregunta n. 90 
de arriba)                             
1= accesible / cercano a la 
vivienda 





4= es la única fuente de crédito en 
mi área de operación 
5 = no requieren 
trámites  
6= conoce o tiene 
información sobre la 
fuente de crédito 
7= puede otorgar un 
crédito más alto  




9 = servicio amable  10 = no requisitos dificiles                             
                                    
83  Usted ahorra? Cuánto por 
mes?  $/mes                            
                                        52 
 
EMPRESA 
                                        
84-
85  Cuántos empleados tiene?  Número  Salario 
diario                               
a  Empleados permanentes                                   
b  Empleados temporales                                   
                                
86  Cuánto invirtió en materiales de trabajo el año anterior? 
(activo fijo)                           
                                
MEJORAMENTO DE LA VIVIENDA 
                                
Pudo realizar mejoras en su casa?                            87-
88 
Especificar los tipos de mejoras 
(por lo menos 2)  Año                             
a                                 
b                                 
c                                 
d                                 
e                                 
f                                 
                                
CLIENTES DE PROTAGONIZAR 
89T  Cuánto obtendría hoy por la 
venta de su negocio?  $                          
¿Cuánto ganaba antes del 
crédito? $                             
1  Muchisimo    (mas de $500)                               
2  mucho    (entre 200/ 500)                               
3  poco    (entre 100/200)                               
90T 
4  muy poco    (menos de 100)                               
   0  Igual que ahora                               53 
 
¿Cuánto ganó después? $                                    
1  Muchisimo    (mas de $500)                               
2  mucho    (entre 200/ 500)                               
3  poco    (entre 100/200)                               
91T 
4  muy poco    (menos de 100)                               
   0  igual que ahora                               
Que tipo de crédito tiene 
usted?                                   
solidario (1)                                   
escalonado (2)                                   
93T 
individual (3)                                   
Si el crédito es solidario, ¿Cómo le parece que funcionó 
su grupo?                                 
Muy bien (3)                                    
Bien (2)                                    
Regular (1)                              
94T 
Mal (0)                              
95T  Repetiría la experiencia de 
pedir crédito en grupo:  Si [1] No [0]                          
96T  SI 95 = Si Lo haría con la 
misma gente?  Si [1] No [0]                          
97T  Si 95 = No, preguntar si 
pediría crédito sólo:  Si [1] No [0]                          
98T  Fue fácil fue incorporarse al 
programa de Protagonizar?  Si [1] No [0]                          
100T  Tiene usted parientes que participaron en 
PROTAGONIZAR antes de usted? Cuantos?  n.                        
101T  si la repuesta es si, cuanto pidieron inicialmente?                          
a     pariente 1 $                       
b     pariente 2 $                       
102T  Tiene usted amigos/conocidos que participaron a 
PROTAGONIZAR antes de usted? Cuantos?  n.                       
103T  si la repuesta es si, cuanto pidieron inicialmente?                          
a     amigo 1 $                       
b     amigo 2 $                       54 
 
104T  Durante el año anterior,  asistió a las actividades de 
capacitación? 
Si [1] No 
[0]                        
105T  En qué año comenzó a recibir 
crédito de Protagonizar?                             
106T  Ha salido del programa alguna 
vez?     Si [1] No 
[0]                        
Si = Si, porqué salió?                            
Incapacidad para pagar el 
crédito (1)                            
No necesita el crédito (actividad 
autosustentable) (2)                            
Cerró el negocio (3)                            
mora (4)                            
problemas con el grupo (5)                            
problemas familiares (hijos, 
enfermedades, etc.) (6)                            
107T 
Otro (Especificar) 
(7)_________________                            
Qué le parecen las condiciones de Protagonizar comparado con 
otros prestamistas?                        
Mejores (3)                             
Iguales (2)                             
Peores (1)                             
108T 
No conoce otros prestamistas 
(0)                             
109T  ¿Tiene planes de invertir en su negocio el próximo año? 
(activo fijo) 
Si [1] No 
[0]                        
Que tipo de problema ha 
tenido con su negocio?  numero                           
Falta de capital (1)   Falta de crédito para 
bienes de capital (3)
 Baja demanda de los 
productos vendidos 
(5)
Alto costo del crédito 
(13) 
Otro (Especifique) 
(17)____            
Falta de créditos para capital de 
trabajo (2) 
Carencia de habilidades 
de marketing (4)
Dificultad para 
competir en el 
mercado  (6)
Altos costos de materia 
prima  (14)  Nada (0)            
Falta de capacidades o técnicas 
de administración (7) 
Deficiente empaquetado 
y diseño de producto  (9)
 Falta de habilidades 
básicas de 
contabilidad (11)
Falta de dispon. de 
insumos (15)                 
110T 
Falta de habilidades técnicas 
(producción) (8) 
Escases de personal 
entrenado (10)
 Falta de acceso a 
mercados (12)
Economía local débil 
(16)                 
                            
SOLO PARA ELIGIBLES NO PARTICIPANTES DE PROTAGONIZAR 55 
 
                                
89C  Conoce Protagonizar?  Si [1] No [0]                          
90C  Conoce a otra persona con 
crédito de Protagonizar? 
Cuantas? 
n.                          
¿Piensa que ellos están en 
mejores condiciones 
económicas?     
                         
   Si [1] No [0]                          
91C 
   no conoce ninguno de 
Protagonizar (-)                          
Le gustaría tener crédito de 
Protagonizar?                              
   Si [1] No [0]                          
92C 
   no conoce ninguno de 
Protagonizar (-)                          
Desde que Protagonizar u otra microfinanciera 
comenzaron a trabajar aqui, piensa que su situación ha:                            
   Mejorado (2)                          
   Empeorado (1)                          
93C 
   Es la misma (0)                          
¿Por qué no se ha integrado 
al programa de Protagonizar?  numero                          
No conoce el programa (1)  Es muy riesgoso (3) Las condiciones y términos del 
programa son muy estrictos (5)
otro (especifique 
cual) (7)__              
94C 
No necesita crédito (2) 
No tiene tiempo para 
este tipo de programas 
(4)
Solicitó entrar al programa pero no 
fue aceptado (6)
Non consiguió grupo 
(8)              
                            
SOLO PARA LO QUE SALIERON DE PROTAGONIZAR 
                                
89D  Cuánto obtendría hoy por la 
venta de su negocio?  $                          
¿Cuánto ganaba antes del 
crédito? $                             
1  Muchisimo    (mas de 
$500)                         
2  mucho    (entre 200/ 500)                         
3  poco    (entre 100/200)                         
90D 
4  muy poco    (menos de 
100)                         56 
 
¿Cuánto ganó después? $                            
1  Muchisimo    (mas de 
$500)                         
2  mucho    (entre 200/ 500)                         
3  poco    (entre 100/200)                         
91D 
4  muy poco    (menos de 
100)                         
¿Cómo le parece que 
funcionó su grupo?  numero                          
Muy bien (3)                             
Bien (2)                             
Regular (1)                             
93D 
Mal (0)                             
94D  Repetiría la experiencia de 
pedir crédito en grupo:  Si [1] No [0]                          
95D  SI 94 = Si Lo haría con la 
misma gente?  Si [1] No [0]                          
96D  Si 94 = No, preguntar si 
pediría crédito sólo:  Si [1] No [0]                          
97D  Fue fácil fue incorporarse al 
programa de Protagonizar?  Si [1] No [0]                          
Antes de pedir el crédito en Protagonizar, realizó alguna 
actividad entre la siguientes?                          
nada (0)                            
participacion a un curso (1)                            
empezar una empresa (2)                            
buscar otras personas que 
necesitaban un credito 3)                            
98D 
otro (especifique cual) (4)                            
99D  Tiene usted parientes que participaron a 
PROTAGONIZAR antes de usted?  cuantos?  n.                        
100D  si la repuesta es si, cuanto pidieron inicialmente?                           
a     pariente 1 $                        
b     pariente 2 $                        
101D  Tiene usted amigos/conocidos que participaron a 
PROTAGONIZAR antes de usted? Cuantos?  n.                        
102D  si la repuesta es si, cuanto pidieron inicialmente?                           
a     amigo 1 $                        57 
 
b     amigo 2 $                        
103D  En qué año comenzó a recibir 
crédito de Protagonizar?                            
104D  Cuando salió del programa de 
Protagonizar?                            
Porqué salió?                            
Incapacidad para pagar el 
crédito (1)                            
No necesita el crédito (actividad 
autosustentable) (2)                            
Cerró el negocio (3)                            
mora (4)                            
problemas con el grupo (5)                            
problemas familiares (hijos, 
enfermedades, etc.) (6)                            
105D 
Otro (Especificar) 
(7)____________                            
Que tipo de problema ha tenido con su negocio?                          
Falta de capital (1)   Falta de crédito para 
bienes de capital (3)
 Baja demanda de los 
productos vendidos 
(5)




         
Falta de créditos para capital de 
trabajo (2) 
Carencia de habilidades 
de marketing (4)
Dificultad para 
competir en el 
mercado  (6)
  Altos costos de materia prima  
(14) Nada (0)          
Falta de capacidades o técnicas 
de administración (7) 
Deficiente empaquetado y diseño de 
producto  (9) 
no habilidades de 
contabilidad (11)
Falta de dispon. de insumos 
(15)            
106D 
Falta de habilidades técnicas 
(producción) (8) 
Escases de personal 
entrenado (10)    Falta de acceso a 





c)INSTRUCTIONS of the GAME 
 
INSTRUCCIONES PARA ENCUESTADORES 
NO MOSTRAR A ENREVISTADOS 
Para el juego, los miembros “NO IMF” (IMF=institución de microcredito)no deben ser miembros de 
Protagonizar ni de otros bancos o Instituciones Microfinancieras (si tienen créditos de prestamistas 
locales no hay problema).  
Para el estudio de impacto los entrevistados deben ser personas elegibles pero no miembros de 
Protagonizar.  
Ambas necesidades se satisfacen si encontramos personas elegibles Y que no sean clientes de otra 
IMF o banco privado.  
Los clientes que han desertado sirven para el estudio de impacto pero no para el experimento de 





Los participantes (la mitad miembros de Protagonizar y la mitad no IMF) han sido divididos aleatoriamente en 
152 pares. Cada par está compuesto por un cesionario (A) y un administrador (B). 
 
Al iniciar el juego ambos jugadores reciben 10 fichas (1 ficha = .5 euros). 
 
Jugador A decide cuántas de las 10 fichas dará al jugador B, debe elegir un entero entre 0 y 10. El 
entrevistador anota el número en la casilla del cuestionario.  
 
Las fichas otorgadas por el jugador A serán multiplicadas por 3 y otorgadas al jugador B. Si x es el número de 
fichas otorgadas, el jugador B recibirá 3x fichas.  
 
Jugador B responderá condicionalmente cuántas fichas entregaría al jugador A, si éste le dió entre 0 y 10, 
sabiendo que el máximo número de fichas es el triple de la cantidad entregada por el jugador A.  
 
Si x es el número de fichas otorgadas por el jugador A al jugador B, B recibirá 3x fichas y decidirá cuántas de 
esas 3x fichas dará al jugador A de regreso.  
 
La ganancia de cada jugador será la siguiente: 
 
Ganancia del Jugador A = 10 fichas – fichas otorgadas al jugador B + fichas otorgadas por el jugador B de 
regreso 
Si x es el número de fichas otorgadas por el jugador A al jugador B, y y es el número de fichas otorgadas de 
regreso por el jugador B al jugador A, al final del experimento el jugador A recibirá:  





Ganancia del jugador B = 10 fichas + triple de fichas otorgadas por A – fichas devueltas al jugador A  
Si x es el número de fichas otorgadas por el jugador A al jugador B, y y es el número de fichas otorgadas de 
regreso por el jugador B al jugador A, al final del experimento el jugador B recibirá:  
10 + 3x – y 
 
 
INSTRUCCIONES PARA EL JUGADOR A: CESIONARIO (TRUSTOR) 
 
Muchas gracias por participar en esta sesión, tendrá una duración aproximada de 15 minutos.  
 
Siendo un juego en el cual se gana dinero real, podrás retirar el dinero que ganes en 45 díasen las oficinas de 
Protagonizar. 
 
La sesión experimental es anónima, te asignaremos un código y eso mantendrá en secreto tu nombre. 
 
A ti y al otro jugador vamos a dar un patrimonio de 10 fichas (1 ficha = .5 euros = 2,5 pesos), por un total de 
25 pesos.   
 
Tú debes decidir cuántas das a tu contraparte (administrador) que tiene algunas características que te 
diremos [por ej., el jugador B puede ser IMF-antiguo / nuevo o No IMF].Esta cantidad será multiplicada por 3 y 
luego el otro jugador decidirá a su vez cuanto restituirte. 
 
Tú jugarásdos veces: la primera con un jugador con unas ciertas características y luego con otro con distintas 
características. 
 
El otro jugador verá lo que recibe y a su vez podrá decidir cuanto restituirte de la cantidad que le enviaste. 
Esta será lo que ganas en la ronda.  
 




JUEGO: PRIMERA RONDA 
1.  En esta primera ronda estarás jugando con una persona que ha sido miembro de una IMF 
llamada Protagonizar_______(más/menos) tiempo que el promedio. De tu patrimonio inicial, 
cuánto le darías al otro jugador? (esta cantidad será multiplicada por 3 y del total el otro jugador 
podrá decidir cuanto restituirte) -  Escribir la respuesta en el cuestionario  
 
JUEGO: SEGUNDA RONDA 
2.  En esta segunda ronda estarás jugando con una persona que no es miembro de la IMF 
Protagonizar y no tiene crédito de ninguna otra institución financiera. De tu patrimonio inicial, 
cuánto le darías al otro jugador? (esta cantidad será multiplicada por 3 y del total el otro jugador 
podrá decidir cuanto restituirte) - Escribir la respuesta en el cuestionario  
 
FIN DELAS RONDAS. De las siguientes 2 preguntas, seleccionaremos al azar una respuesta y recibirás 
5 fichas (=10 pesos) si es correcta.  
 
1.  En la primera ronda, cuanto esperasque la persona que pertenece a Protagonizar te devuelva?  
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FINE JUEGO. Preguntas generales 
3.  Por qué le diste dinero a la otra persona (miembro de IMF Protagonizar) en la primera ronda? 
(es posible hacer respuestas múltiples en orden de prioridad)  
a)  Confío en él 
b)  Espero que me devuelva lo mismo o más de lo que le di 
c)  Me hace sentir bien que él tenga una ganancia 
d)  No me gusta el trato desigual entre él y yo 
 
4.  Por qué le dio dinero a la otra persona (miembro de ninguna IMF) en la segunda ronda? (es 
posible hacer respuestas múltiples en orden de prioridad)  
a)  Confío en él 
b)  Espero que me devuelva lo mismo o más de lo que le di 
c)  Me hace sentir bien que él tenga una ganancia 
d)  No me gusta el trato desigual entre él y yo 
 
Gracias por su disponibilidad. 
 
 
INSTRUCCIONES PARA EL JUGADOR B: ADMINISTRADOR (TRUSTEE) 
 
Muchas gracias por participar en esta sesión, tendrá una duración aproximada de 15 minutos.  
 
Siendo un juego en el cual se gana dinero real, podrás retirar el dinero que ganes en 45 días en las oficinas 
de Protagonizar. 
 
La sesión experimental es anónima, te asignaremos un código y eso mantendrá en secreto tu nombre. 
 
A ti y al otro jugador les vamos a dar un patrimonio de 10 fichas (1 ficha = .5 euros = 2,5 pesos), por un total 
de 25 pesos.  
 
Usted jugará dos veces, el pago será elegido al azar entre esas dos rondas.  
 
Un jugador (cesionario) con algunas características que te diremos [puede ser IMF-antiguo / nuevo o No 
IMF]te ha enviado una parte de su patrimonio (de 0 a 10).  La cuantidad elegida por él ha sido multiplicada por 
3 a la hora de llegarte.   
 
Tú debes decidir cuánto de lo que has recibido restituirle. Lo que queda será tu ganancia final.  
 
Tú jugarás dos veces: la primera vez recibes dinero desde un jugador con unas ciertas características y luego 
desde otro con distintas características. 
 




JUEGO: PRIMERA RONDA 
En esta primera ronda jugarás con una persona que no es miembro de la IMF Protagonizar y no tiene crédito 
con otra institución financiera.  61 
 
 
1.  Cuánto dinero da de vuelta en cada caso: 
Si la otra persona envió 2,50     y a usted le llegó    7,50,           usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 5         y a usted le llegó        15,           usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 7.50    y a usted le llegó  22.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 10      y a usted le llegó        30,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 12,50  y a usted le llegó 37.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 15       y a usted le llegó      45,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 17,50 y a usted le llegó 52.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 20     y a usted le llegó       60,     usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 22,50 y a usted le llegó 67.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 25     y a usted le llegó       75,        usted le daría ___  
 
 
JUEGO: SEGUNDA RONDA 
En esta segunda ronda jugarás con una persona que es un cliente de la IMF PROTAGONIZARque ha 
pertenecido al programa_______(más/menos) tiempo que el promedio42.  
 
2.  Cuánto dinero da de vuelta en cada caso: 
Si la otra persona envió 2,50     y a usted le llegó    7,50,           usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 5         y a usted le llegó        15,           usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 7.50    y a usted le llegó  22.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 10      y a usted le llegó        30,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 12,50  y a usted le llegó 37.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 15       y a usted le llegó      45,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 17,50 y a usted le llegó 52.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 20     y a usted le llegó       60,     usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 22,50 y a usted le llegó 67.50,      usted le daría ___  
Si la otra persona envió 25     y a usted le llegó       75,        usted le daría ___  
 
FINDEL JUEGO.  
 
I) Preguntas con ganancias 
 
De las siguientes 2 preguntas, seleccionaremos al azar una respuesta y recibirás 5 fichas si es correcta.  
 
1.  Cuánto dinero crees que la otra persona(no miembro de IMF Protagonizar) te envió en la primera 
ronda? 
 
2.  Cuánto dinero crees que la otra persona(miembro de ninguna IMF)  te envió en la segunda ronda? 
 
De las siguientes 2 preguntas, seleccionaremos al azar una respuesta y usted recibirá 5 fichas si es correcta.  
 
3.  Le pedimos a la otra persona que adivinara tu elección sobre cuánto dinero dar de regreso, 
únicamente sabiendo si usted es miembro de una IMF o no, y hace cuanto. Cuál crees que fue su 
repuesta en la primera ronda(en la cual jugaste con una persona que no está en ningún proyecto de 
microcrédito)?  
 
                                                 
42 la mitad de los juegos decir más tiempo que el promedio, la otra mitad que menos tiempo que el promedio 
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4.  Le pedimos a la otra persona que adivinara tu elección sobre cuánto dinero dar de regreso, 
únicamente sabiendo si usted es miembro de una IMF o no, y hace cuanto. Cuál crees que fue su 
repuesta en la segunda ronda(en la cual jugaste con un cliente de la IMF PROTAGONIZAR)?  
 
II) Preguntas generales 
 
5.  Por qué le dio dinero de vuelta a esta persona en la primera ronda? 
a)  Soy una persona en quien se puede confiar (los demás pueden contar conmigo) 
b)  No me gusta que él tenga mucho menos que yo 
c)  Me hace sentir bien que él tenga una ganancia 
d)  No me gusta el trato desigual entre él y yo 
 
6.  Por qué le dio dinero de vuelta a esta persona en la segunda ronda? 
a)  Soy una persona en quien se puede confiar (los demás pueden contar conmigo) 
b)  No me gusta que él tenga mucho menos que yo 
c)  Me hace sentir bien que él tenga una ganancia 
d)  No me gusta el trato desigual entre él y yo 
 
 
 